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Pursuing Environmental Justice: Obstacles and
Opportunities—Lessons from the Field†
Helen H. Kang

INTRODUCTION
When I was invited to participate in the Access to Equal Justice:
Critical Perspectives on Court and Law Reform Colloquium, our
panel was slated to discuss Pursuing Environmental Justice:
Obstacles and Opportunities. Before our panel convened, Professor
Jane Spinak delivered the keynote address for the colloquium. I
attended Professor Spinak‘s speech mostly out of collegial respect; I
did not think that family law had anything to contribute to
environmental justice. But as I listened to the talk, I was struck by
how pertinent some of the questions Professor Spinak raised about
family court reform are to environmental justice.
Professor Spinak‘s talk challenged me to consider some
fundamental questions about my own work in environmental justice.
Why do our clients at the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic (―the
clinic‖) end up in court at all? What do these clients and the nature of
their cases have to say about environmental law? What do the
answers to these questions suggest about law reform? These
questions are important to the environmental justice movement. Just
as epidemiologists study clinical cases to learn about the etiology of
† I take inspiration from the title of Luke W. Cole‘s Correspondence, Remedies for
Environmental Racism: A View from the Field, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1991 (1992).
Director, Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, and Associate Professor, Golden
Gate University School of Law. B.A. (1982), Yale University; J.D. (1986), Boalt Hall,
University of California at Berkeley. Environmental Law and Justice Clinic was established in
1994 to provide legal representation and advocacy to environmental groups and communities
fighting disproportionate environmental health hazards, with a special focus on communities of
color and low-income neighborhoods. Thanks to Cliff Rechtschaffen, Karen Pierce, and
Bradley Angel for their valuable comments on this Article and to my clinic clients and
colleagues from whom I take ideas and draw inspiration.
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disease, law practitioners can study judicial cases to learn about the
environment and the state of environmental regulation.
In response to these questions, I argue that the clinic‘s clients and
similarly situated grassroots groups pursue litigation because the laws
do not adequately protect them from pollution at the neighborhood
level. Environmental lawsuits filed by such groups result from the
conclusion that there is ―too much‖ pollution in the neighborhood—
there is elevated background pollution, violations of environmental
laws contribute to excess pollution, and litigation is one of the few
ways to redress the distributive injustice resulting from pollution
created by multiple sources.
Addressing neighborhood-level pollution through legislation and
regulation should be a priority for communities and governments at
all levels because environmental justice is a larger societal concern.
Even beyond the potential health impacts pollution can cause, it
worsens vulnerabilities that already exist in poor and minority
neighborhoods. Without change, even communities that are
organized and resourceful enough to pursue litigation will be able to
seek only case-by-case redress in the courts. They will not be able to
effect the system-wide reform that is needed to address cumulative
pollution and pollution hot spots. Courts will remain the only fora in
which these communities can seek procedural and corrective—if not
distributive and social—justice.1
Reforms to address neighborhood pollution are possible, but only
if governments and citizens make a serious commitment. There are
many reform possibilities, including moving quickly to implement
specific regulatory programs to instill confidence in the government‘s
resolve to address such pollution, identifying vulnerable
communities, and providing for procedural and substantive
protections specific to high-impact areas. This Article focuses on air
pollution because of the well-documented impacts of air quality
disparities and environmental justice groups‘ efforts to address them
through litigation.
1. See Robert Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10681
(2000) (explaining the different conceptions of justice relevant to environmental justice:
distributive, procedural, corrective, and social justice).
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I. WHAT IS AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITY?
In Dreams from My Father, President Obama describes Altgeld,
one of the communities in Chicago in which he worked as a
community organizer. Altgeld painfully resembles the neighborhoods
our clinic attempts to protect:
The Altgeld Gardens public housing project sat at Chicago‘s
southernmost edge . . . .
To the east, on the other side of the expressway, was the Lake
Calumet landfill, the largest in the Midwest.
And to the north, directly across the street, was the
Metropolitan Sanitary District‘s sewage treatment plant. . . .
The stench, the toxins, the empty uninhabited landscape.
For close to a century, the few square miles surrounding
Altgeld had taken in the offal of scores of factories, the price
people had paid for their high-wage jobs. Now that the jobs
were gone, and those people that could had already left, it
seemed only natural to use the land as a dump.
A dump—and a place to house poor blacks.
Still, everything about the Gardens seemed in a perpetual
state of disrepair. Ceilings crumbled. Pipes burst. Toilets
backed up. . . . So that most children in Altgeld grew up
without ever having seen a garden. Children who could see
only that things were used up, and that there was a certain
pleasure in speeding up the decay.2
At the clinic, we define environmental justice (―EJ‖) communities
as low-income communities and communities with a majority
population who are people of color. While we couple this
demographic description with another modifier that is typically used
to describe EJ communities—populations that bear disproportionate
pollution burdens and enjoy fewer environmental amenities—this
2. BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND INHERITANCE
164–66 (2004 ed.).
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second modifier tends to be redundant. When cases come to us from
low-income or people-of-color communities, disproportionate
environmental benefits and burdens are always present. Pollution
mapping and academic studies suggest that our experience is not
unique.
Indeed, EJ communities are too easily found in many places.3
Perhaps the definition that EJ communities and their advocates use is
similar to Justice Potter Stewart‘s test for obscenity: ―I know it when
I see it.‖4 In the San Francisco Bay Area alone, several communities
are low-income, with majority people of color; these communities are
burdened disproportionately by pollution and enjoy fewer
environmental amenities: West Oakland; the Hunters Point Bayview
community in San Francisco; Richmond; East Palo Alto; parts of San
Jose and Redwood City; and communities in transition, such as
Antioch and Pittsburg in Contra Costa County, which are home to
many families displaced by economic development in the central part
of the San Francisco Bay Area.5 These Bay Area communities, in
addition to being viscerally recognizable as EJ communities, are
well-documented pollution hot spots. Pollution maps using
3. For descriptions of many EJ communities and the issues they face, see Charles Lee,
Warren County’s Legacy for the Quest to Eliminate Health Disparities, 1 GOLDEN GATE U.
ENVTL. L.J. 53, 59–60 (2007). See also Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A. 3:98-CV-2955-D,
2002 WL 230834, at *1, *7 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (describing the EJ community of Cadillac
Heights, Texas); Emily L. Dawson, Lessons Learned from Flint, Michigan: Managing Multiple
Source Pollution in Urban Communities, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 367, 379–
82 (2001) (describing the EJ community of Flint, Michigan).
4. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Potter, J., concurring).
5. The Bay Area Environmental Health Collaborative‘s website hosts pollution maps
with information on racial demographics and accumulation of pollution sources. See Bay Area
Environmental Health Collaborative, Cumulative Impact Maps and Powerpoints,
http://www.baehc.org/poped.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2009); see also MANUEL PASTOR, JAMES
SAAD & RACHEL MORELLO-FROSCH, CTR. FOR JUSTICE, TOLERANCE, & CMTY., UNIV. OF
CAL., SANTA CRUZ, STILL TOXIC AFTER ALL THESE YEARS: AIR QUALITY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 6 (2007), http://www2.ucsc.edu/
cjtc/docs/bay_final.pdf [hereinafter PASTOR ET AL., STILL TOXIC] (utilizing such a map). The
STILL TOXIC report exemplifies community-based research in which academics conduct
research that communities request. This report was prepared by the University of California,
Santa Cruz‘s Center for Justice, Tolerance & Community, for the Bay Area Environmental
Health Collaborative, a community advocacy group comprised of several coalitions and about
twenty environmental advocacy groups and grassroots organizations. The Environmental Law
and Justice Clinic is part of this collaborative.
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Geographic Information System show that race and pollution
correlate uncomfortably well in those areas.6
II. WHY DOES THE PURSUIT OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
REMAIN IMPORTANT?
Since President Clinton issued his executive order on
environmental justice fifteen years ago,7 government agencies have
developed environmental justice policies.8 Many agencies have also
6. The Geographic Information Systems (―GIS‖) maps that show the relationship
between race and pollution are accessible online. See Bay Area Environmental Health
Collaborative Maps, http://www.baehc.org (follow hyperlinks to various GIS maps) (last visited
Dec. 2, 2009). GIS mapping allows pictorial representations of data for particular locations and
often is used as a social justice tool. See GIS/Mapping, Kirwan Inst. for the Study of Race and
Ethnicity, The Ohio State Univ., http://kirwaninstitute.org/research/gismapping/ (last visited
Dec. 2, 2009) (―[R]esearchers recognize that inequality has a geographic footprint, and have
pioneered the use of maps to communicate the history and presence of discriminatory and
exclusionary policies that spatially segregate people.‖). For another example of GIS mapping,
see TOTAL AIRBORNE LEAD EMISSIONS BY UNITED STATES COUNTY, NATURAL RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/health/effects/lead/lead_emitters_county_map.pdf. At the
Association of American Law Schools‘ May 2009 Annual Conference, I saw a foreclosure map
of Cleveland, Ohio, most likely generated using GIS. I thought that it would be useful to
overlay that map against pollution mapping to see how well they match up.
One of the limitations of GIS mapping is that it is very resource intensive to create GIS
maps and make them user-friendly. Our clinic‘s experience is that producing GIS maps requires
substantial time, first to acquire and understand the underlying data, and then to refine and
reduce obvious errors in the data. GIS mapping also requires collaboration among different
experts, including a graphic artist.
7. Executive Order 12898 states that to the ―extent practicable and permitted by law . . .
each Federal agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by
identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or
environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and lowincome populations in the United States.‖ Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16,
1994). Bradley Angel of Greenaction for Health & Environmental Justice points out that the
EPA and other government agencies systematically violate their own Environmental Justice
policies, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Executive Order. E-mail from
Bradley Angel, Executive Director of Greenaction, to Helen Kang (Sept. 9, 2009) (on file with
author).
8. For a survey of federal agency responses, see Denis Binder et al., A Survey of Federal
Agency Response to President Clinton’s Executive Order 12898 on Environmental Justice, 31
ENVTL. L. REP. 11133 (2001). States have also enacted legislation directed at promoting
environmental justice. See, e.g., Antonette Benita Cordero & Carol J. Monahan, Environmental
Justice Grows Up, ENVTL. L. NEWS, Fall 2003, at 15 (discussing California‘s environmental
justice legislation). The South Coast Air Quality Management District was among the first
government agencies to formally adopt guiding principles and initiatives to ensure
environmental justice. See S. COAST AIR QUALITY MGMT. DIST., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVES (1997), http://www.aqmd.gov/ej/ej_original10.htm; S. COAST AIR QUALITY
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provided funding opportunities for grassroots groups that work on
environmental issues.9 Some agencies have sponsored seminal
studies of pollution hot spots as a result of consistent and organized
demands from communities and growing health research on
disproportionate exposure to pollution and cumulative risk.10
But government agencies have not pursued these environmental
justice goals with a sustained effort. Thus, to date, environmental
justice considerations have failed to affect environmental decision
making.11 Similarly, and perhaps consequentially, there does not
appear to be evidence that environmental justice considerations have
changed the behavior of polluters in any significant way.
Meanwhile, evidence of environmental injustice has become more
compelling. This evidence shows that minority and low-income
communities continue to suffer disproportionate environmental
impacts, while enjoying fewer benefits.12 Studies also demonstrate
MGMT. DIST., GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE (1997), http://www.aqmd.gov/ej/
EJ_guiding_principles.htm.
9. For a description of the Environmental Protection Agency‘s (―EPA‖) grant program
aimed at reducing community exposure to toxics, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Community Action for a Renewed Environment (CARE), http://www.epa.gov/care/ (last visited
Dec. 2, 2009).
10. In 1999, the California Air Resources Board established a Neighborhood Assessment
Program to evaluate cumulative air pollution on the neighborhood scale; the Bay Area Air
Quality Management District launched its Community Air Risk Evaluation initiative in 2004.
See KEN KLOC, ENVTL. LAW & JUSTICE CLINIC, GOLDEN GATE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, ZONES OF
INEQUITY: CUMULATIVE AIR POLLUTION AND HOT SPOTS IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA
11, 20 (2009), http://www.ggu.edu/school_of_law/academic_law_program/environmental_law/
environmental_law_justice_clinic/attachment/Zones+of+Inequity.pdf.
Dr. Kloc recommends that regulators adopt a broad definition of cumulative risk, such as
that adopted by the EPA Risk Assessment Forum in 2003 in its Framework for Cumulative Risk
Assessment; he defines cumulative risk as ―the combined risks from aggregate exposures to
multiple agents or stressors.‖ KLOC, supra, at 7 (quoting EPA RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM,
FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (2003)). Aggregate exposure in turn is
defined as the total exposure to a stressor by ―relevant routes, pathways, and sources‖; stressors
may be chemical, biological, or physical agents, or activities that alter or cause the loss of a
necessity, whether through direct or Adopt enforceable measures to evaluate, limit and reduce
cumulative health risks. KLOC, supra, at 7–8 (quoting EPA RISK ASSESSMENT FORUM,
FRAMEWORK FOR CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT (2003).
11. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 05-289, EPA SHOULD DEVOTE
MORE ATTENTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE WHEN DEVELOPING CLEAN AIR RULES 3–6
(2005) (discussing the limited attention given to environmental justice by the EPA).
12. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Evidence of Environmental Injustice, ENVTL. L.
NEWS, Fall 2003, at 3 [hereinafter Rechtschaffen, Evidence of Environmental Injustice]; see
also MICHAEL ASH ET AL., JUSTICE IN THE AIR: TRACKING TOXIC POLLUTION FROM
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that race is more strongly correlated with this disparity than is any
other variable, including income.13 The significant disparity in
benefits and burdens raises more than legal and policy questions; it
raises questions about who we are as a society. These moral questions
are especially pressing because environmental vulnerability is but one
of the many challenges that minority and low-income communities
AMERICA‘S INDUSTRIES AND COMPANIES TO OUR STATES, CITIES, AND NEIGHBORHOODS 6–8
(2009), http://college.usc.edu/geography/ESPE/documents/justice_air_web.pdf; PASTOR ET AL.,
STILL TOXIC, supra note 5; Jayajit Chakraborty & Marc P. Armstrong, Using Geographic
Plume Analysis to Assess Community Vulnerability to Hazardous Accidents, 19 COMPUTERS,
ENVTL. & URB. SYS. 341 (1995) (showing that minorities and low-income households are
disproportionately exposed to toxic substances released in truck accidents); Robert B. Gunier et
al., Traffic Density in California: Socioeconomic and Ethnic Differences among Potentially
Exposed Children, 13 J. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS & ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 240–46 (2003) (noting
that in California, the proportion of children of color living on blocks with high traffic density
is inversely related to median family income, and that children of color are three times more
likely to live in high-traffic areas than are white children); Lee, supra note 3, at 60–66; Clifford
Rechtschaffen, Strategies for Implementing the Environmental Justice Vision, 1 GOLDEN GATE
U. ENVTL. L.J. 321, 323 (2007) [hereinafter Rechtschaffen, Strategies].
13. Rechtschaffen, Evidence of Environmental Injustice, supra note 12, at 5–7; see also
PASTOR ET AL., STILL TOXIC, supra note 5, at 8. The authors of the STILL TOXIC report explain
the evidence this way:
The land use perspective suggests that hazards are located where complementary
land uses, such as industrial facilities or traffic arteries, are clustered; therefore, any
correlation of environmental ―bads‖ with race is viewed as an unfortunate byproduct
of economic geography. The income view sees the role of property values as key:
more hazardous land uses tend to be where income levels and property values are low,
and co-location of the poor and toxics simply reflects the normal workings of the
market system. In both perspectives, while health impacts could remain significant,
environmental disparities are basically benign in intent . . . .
The power perspective suggests that hazard location and poor air quality depends on
a community‘s ability—or inability—to resist placement of undesirable land uses in
their neighborhood. In this view, discriminatory practices and/or power differentials
are largely responsible for the patterns of environmental disparity that are frequently
observed. And since race and power are so highly intertwined in our society, patterns
of difference by race are suggestive of patterns of difference by power.
In the real world, all three of these factors—land use, income and power– are
inextricably linked. Communities with less political voice may be less able to contest
incompatible land uses, and income is not just a reflection of a market system but also
a marker of influence in the decision-making process. Yet, if race still matters once
land use and income levels are accounted for, this suggests that differential access to
political power and policy voice may be important to consider and address in the
regulatory process.
PASTOR ET AL., STILL TOXIC, supra note 5, at 3.
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face.14 Communities that are burdened with pollution and have less
access to environmental benefits also suffer from crime, violence,
chronic stress,15 lack of access to open space,16 minimal economic
opportunities, inadequate public schools, and insufficient access to
healthy foods.17
14. See Unnatural Causes . . . Is Inequality Making Us Sick?, Backgrounders from the
Unnatural Causes Health Equity Database (2008), http://www.unnaturalcauses.org/assets/
uploads/file/primers.pdf [hereinafter Backgrounders]. In the United States, where you live is a
good predictor of health. Id. at 11. You could even say that where you live can kill you:
Studies have shown, for example, that living in a disadvantaged neighborhood leads to
a 50–80% increase in risk for heart disease—the number one killer in America. One
reason is chronic stress. Worrying about violence, lousy schools, and unpaid bills;
living in substandard housing or a polluted environment; not having good access to
fresh food, reliable transportation, or safe public spaces—all of these have a negative,
even toxic effect on health.
Unnatural Causes . . . Is Inequality Making Us Sick?: Place Matters (California Newsreel 2008)
(episode transcript available at http://www.unnaturalcauses.org/assets/uploads/file/UC_
Description_All.pdf).
15. Researchers now have substantial evidence that chronic stress early in life correlates
negatively to a human being‘s ability to cope later in life by affecting brain development. See
Backgrounders, supra note 14, at 3.
16. See generally CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 132–33 (1998). For recent studies on the distribution of benefits, see
PAUL STANTON KIBEL, GOLDEN GATE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CITY PARKS PROJECT, ACCESS TO
PARKLAND: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AT EAST BAY PARKS (2007) (observing that the largest
park system in the San Francisco Bay Area has most of its holdings in hillside areas, near
affluent, white communities); see also Robert Garcia & Aubrey White, Warren County’s
Legacy for Healthy Parks, Schools & Urban Communities: Park Victories from the Cornfield to
El Congreso and Beyond, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 127, 129–31 (2007). For an analysis
linking the decline of Klamath River Salmon due to dam and water mismanagement to rates of
heart disease and diabetes in Karuk tribal members, see KARI MARIE NORGAARD, THE EFFECTS
OF ALTERED DIET ON THE HEALTH OF THE KARUK PEOPLE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT 26–31
(2004) (on file with author). At the same time that the dams deprived the Karuk and other
tribes, including the Yurok, of their connection to the river, the power from the dams did not
serve the tribes:
It is a cruel irony that the hydropower facilities on the Klamath River do not provide
power to most of the Yurok Reservation downstream of the dams. Nearly 80% of the
Yurok Reservation is without a connection to the electric grid. Residents rely upon
modest solar panels and portable generators for power; and otherwise, they live much
as they did in the 19th century. The public elementary school located there relies upon
noisy, polluting diesel generators for power.
Scott W. Williams, The Boundaries of Winters—When the Courts Alone Are Not Enough to
Protect Indian Reserved Rights, in THE FUTURE OF RESERVED WATER RIGHTS (Barbara Cosens
& Judith Royster eds.) (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 20, n.12, on file with author).
17. See generally Dawson, supra note 3, at 368–71 (describing common characteristics of
EJ communities).
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Given these disparities, it is even more important to raise
environmental justice as a societal concern, not simply as an issue for
vulnerable communities. 18 Just as civil rights became a quest for all
Americans, so too should environmental justice. How the most
vulnerable segment of our society lives ultimately reflects on all of
us.
III. WHICH CASES DO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES
LITIGATE?
Getting to Professor Spinak‘s question, why do our clients end up
in court? Short of a comprehensive or systematic study of EJ
litigation, I offer an impressionistic answer based on my experiences
in EJ litigation and collaborations with EJ groups, as well as on cases
discussed in the media.
Despite the difficulties that judicial enforcement poses for
citizens, which I discuss later in this Article, EJ advocates continue to
have a sizeable litigation docket against polluters and regulators. This
robust docket represents only a small fraction of meritorious cases:
many are turned away because the few firms that represent EJ groups
18. The EPA‘s current Administrator, Lisa Jackson, recognizes the societal costs of
pollution on the neighborhood level:
Environmental justice can also be a ―force multiplier‖ for other issues.
The people that get sick at two and three times the average rate because of pollution in
their neighborhoods are the same people that predominantly get their health care in
emergency rooms. That drives up costs system-wide, and hurts both the local and the
nationwide economy.
In our schools, when children are repeatedly missing class with asthma or allergies, it
affects educational outcomes and long-term economic potential. . . .
Or in the neighborhood, visible environmental degradation can compound problems.
Businesses won‘t invest in that community and economic possibilities are limited. As a
result crime is higher, violence is higher—often times drugs use is rampant—and the
vicious cycle continues.
Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, U.S. EPA, Remarks to the National Environmental Justice
Advisory Council (July 21, 2009) (transcript available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.
nsf/8d49f7ad4bbcf4ef852573590040b7f6/313ec9a2bc80d677852575fa007b3c42!OpenDocume
nt). In addition to the cumulative effects of socioeconomic vulnerabilities and pollution,
socioeconomic vulnerabilities are thought to increase susceptibility to pollution. See Lee, supra
note 3, at 61–64.
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have limited litigation capacity. Most EJ litigation falls into one of
several identifiable categories.
A. Cases Challenging Siting of New Sources of Pollution or
Expansion of Existing Sources
Archetypal EJ litigation involves fighting off new sources of
pollution. Indeed, many view the struggle of the predominantly
African-American community in Warren County, North Carolina, to
fight off a toxic dump as the case that spawned the environmental
justice movement.19 The struggle that began in Warren County
continues in communities throughout the nation. In most of these
cases, residents are motivated by an overwhelming sense of fear and
worry for their own health and for the health of their families and
communities.20
Recent cases from California illustrate this type of litigation. In
the San Francisco Bay Area, when a Chevron refinery proposed to
expand, several EJ groups sued the City of Richmond, which had
conducted an environmental review of the project under California‘s
equivalent of the National Environmental Policy Act. The EJ groups
were successful, and the trial court set aside the project approval for,
among other reasons, the city‘s failure to describe whether the project
will process heavier crude slate than the refinery currently is
processing and improper deferral of greenhouse gas mitigation
measures.21
19. See, e.g., Dollie Burwell & Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Comes Full Circle:
Warren County Before and After 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 9, 10 (2007).
20. These feelings are common in people living near pollution that is ―involuntarily
imposed, or regarded as beyond individual control.‖ Theresa A. Satterfield, Risk, Remediation
and the Stigma of a Technological Accident in an African-American Community, 7 HUM.
ECOLOGY REV. 1, 2 (2000); see also LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND
UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
80–81 (2001) (describing the devastation and anger felt by community members and organizer
Lupe Martinez, in reaction to incidents of death and disease in Buttonwillow, California, a host
to a toxic dump). The standing declarations in the clinic‘s cases against repeat violators reflect
similar emotions of fear, anger, and worry.
21. Cmtys. for a Better Env‘t v. City of Richmond, No. N08-1429 (Cal. Super. Ct, June 4,
2009) (unreported minute order).
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The City of Richmond has been described as a ―long-neglected
urban neighborhood‖ in which
Segregation and lack of access to jobs, nutritious foods, and
safe, affordable housing have been harmful to the health of
long-time African American residents . . . .
. . . Richmond has higher than average rates of asthma
hospitalization, higher rates of diabetes, and lower life
expectancy. . . . Tobacco, liquor and fast food are everywhere,
but fresh produce isn‘t. Quality affordable housing is hard to
find, and so are safe places to play and exercise.22
A city of about 100,000 residents, 80 percent of whom are people
of color, Richmond is home to the Chevron refinery, as well as
General Chemical Corporation, a sanitary landfill, and a Superfund
site resulting from a former DDT formulation plant.23
In Bayview Hunters-Point, also located in the San Francisco Bay
Area, a local community group successfully stopped the City of San
Francisco from exempting from environmental review a major
expansion of a rendering plant into a plant that would produce ten
million gallons of biodiesel annually.24 As described earlier, the
Bayview Hunters-Point community is a recognized EJ community.
In Southern California, an EJ group, in collaboration with a
national environmental group, successfully stopped eleven power
plant projects that were proposed for the Los Angeles area by
prohibiting the regional air quality district from dispensing emissions
22. Unnatural Causes . . . Is Inequality Making Us Sick?: Place Matters, supra note 14.
23. See U.S. EPA, TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY: 2007 CALIFORNIA REPORT, available at
http://www.epa.gov/region/toxic/tri/report/07/CalStateReport-2007.pdf; Region 9: Superfund,
United Heckathorn Co., http://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/sfund/r9sfdocw.nsf/vwsoalphabetic/United+
Heckathorn+Co.?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) (EPA information about the United
Heckathorn Superfund site in Richmond). According to the most recent report available, the
Chevron refinery in Richmond was one of the top ten facilities in California for on-site and offsite releases of chemicals reported on the Toxics Release Inventory forms. U.S. EPA, TOXICS
RELEASE INVENTORY: 2007 CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra.
24. See Robert Selna, Environmentalists Delay S.F. Biodiesel Plans, S.F. CHRON., April 3,
2009, at B-1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/04/02/BAQ
516RSCV.DTL.
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credits to these plants that originally had been reserved for essential
public services such as hospitals and schools.25
B. Cases Challenging Rulemaking
Typically, EJ groups do not directly become involved in national
rulemaking.26 Rather, EJ groups bring cases against regulators that
involve environmental laws with particularized local or regional
impacts. For example, a coalition of former residents of
Herculaneum, Missouri, who had been exposed to high levels of
airborne lead filed a lawsuit to compel review of the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards for lead, which had not been changed
in three decades. The lawsuit resulted in more stringent national
standards.27 Similarly, to ensure that pollution is minimized to the
greatest extent allowed by law, EJ groups have challenged State
Implementation Plans that are designed to achieve the National
Ambient Air Quality Standards.28 Some EJ groups have filed suits
25. See SoCal Power Plants on Hold, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2008/07/
socal-power-pla.html (July 29, 2008, 18:59 PST).
26. I do not believe that the EJ groups‘ lack of participation in national rulemaking
indicates a lack of interest. For example, a local community group in San Francisco shared
common interests with large environmental groups that challenged EPA‘s Phase II rules
governing cooling water intake structures from large, existing power plants. The local
community group, Bayview Hunters Point Community Advocates, was interested in the rule
because it was concerned with harm to marine organisms: many of the group‘s constituents fish
in the San Francisco Bay for subsistence. But the group did not have the resources to participate
in the litigation, and the large environmental groups provided excellent representation.
An exception to the general trend of EJ groups‘ lack of participation on national
rulemaking challenges, however, may be in the greenhouse gases arena. Because of expected
impacts on minority and low-income neighborhoods, some EJ groups have been actively
involved in litigation involving greenhouse gases. See, e.g., Ass‘n of Irritated Residents v. U.S.
Envtl. Protection Agency, 423 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). It is not surprising to see EJ groups
litigating in this area because there is considerable disagreement between EJ groups and
traditional environmental groups on how greenhouse gases should be regulated, mostly notably
as to cap and trade. EJ groups oppose cap and trade. See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN,
EILEEN GAUNA & CATHERINE A. O‘NEILL, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY AND
REGULATION 424–25 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE LAW] (quoting Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change
Policy, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10287 (2008)).
27. Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Toughens Standard on Lead Emissions; Change Is the First
in 3 Decades, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, at 15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
10/17/washington/17epa.html.
28. Docket information from law school clinics that represent EJ groups in California
refer to such cases. See Golden Gate University Environmental Law and Justice Clinic,
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challenging specific air pollution regulation promulgated by regional
air quality agencies, such as regulations applicable to open-air
composting of sewage sludge.29
Recent EJ lawsuits also include litigation against regulators for
failing to take into consideration the particularized impacts of climate
change that EJ communities are expected to suffer, including
exacerbation of existing air pollution problems.30
C. Cases against Pollution Sources
Another category of cases EJ advocates typically litigate exhibits
what Professors Eileen Gauna, Catherine O‘Neill, and Clifford and
Rechtschaffen call the ―straw that breaks the camel‘s back‖
phenomenon.31 These cases emerge when burdened communities say
that they ―cannot take it anymore‖ upon discovering yet another
assault on their environment. As Lucy Ramos, president of Mothers
of East Los Angeles, proclaimed in the context of a power plant her
community is fighting: ―Our community is not a dumping ground.‖32
While the cases challenging new or expanding pollution sources
fall into this ―straw that breaks the camel‘s back‖ category, cases
http://www.ggu.edu/school_of_law/academic_law_programs/jd_program/environmental_law/
environmental_law_justice_clinic/cases_and_clients (last visited Dec. 2, 2009); Tulane Law
School Environmental Law Clinic, http://www.tulane.edu/~telc/assets/pdfs/ lawsuits.pdf (last
visited Dec. 2, 2009); Washington University School of Law, Interdisciplinary Environmental
Clinic News, http://law.wustl.edu/internv/index.asp?id=431 (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
29. See, e.g., Helphinkley.org v. Mojave Desert Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., No. CIVBS
800976 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2009) (challenging a rule governing composting facilities that
process green waste and sewage sludge). The trial court determined that the air district violated
the California Environmental Quality Act by failing to conduct environmental review of the
composting rule. Id. at 6–7. The court determined that, because nearby air districts had more
stringent rulings governing composting, including requiring an enclosure with an aeration
system, there could be adverse environmental impacts from promulgating a less stringent rule,
which could encourage additional siting of composting facilities in the region. Id. at 6.
30. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents, 423 F.3d at 995–97. Plaintiffs in these types of cases
include local and regional EJ groups such as California Communities Against Toxics, Coalition
for a Safe Environment and West County Toxics Coalition. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Ass‘n of
Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CPF-09-509 562 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 10, 2009).
31. See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, Catherine A. O‘Neill & Clifford Rechtschaffen,
Environmental Justice 7 (Ctr. for Progressive Regulation, White Paper No. 505, 2005).
32. Judge‘s Ruling Throws Southern California Power Plants into Disarray,
http://cbenewsarchives.blogspot.com/2009/01/judges-ruling-throws-southern.html (Jan. 14,
2009, 15:14 PST).
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against existing pollution sources fit the category as well. A local EJ
group‘s case against a San Francisco power plant illustrates this type
of litigation. In the midst of a claimed energy crisis in California in
2001, the regional air quality district, the EPA, and Mirant Potrero
(the operator of the power plant) entered into a Compliance and
Mitigation Agreement, which allowed Mirant to exceed the permitted
number of hours that its peaker plants could operate in a given year;
in exchange, Mirant paid a penalty.33 The purpose of the agreement
was to increase energy production by using peaker plants that had
been designed for use only during periods of peak energy demand.
The problem, from the community‘s perspective, was that these
peaker plants burned diesel fuel, the combustion of which results in
dirtier emissions than from natural gas.
When the government‘s Compliance and Mitigation Agreement
with the power plant became public in 2001, there were two power
plants in the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood, although one of
the plants in the neighborhood has since closed through persistent and
organized efforts of a coalition of community groups working
together with the City of San Francisco. In addition to being home to
the two power plants, the neighborhood also hosted a large sewage
treatment plant and a number of maritime industries,34 including a
fat-rendering plant and cement and aggregate plants. When the
leaders of the Bayview Hunters Point Community Advocates group
found out about the agreement, they were enraged that the
33. Compliance and Mitigation Agreement between Mirant Potrero, LLC and the Bay
Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (Mar. 29, 2001) (on file with the Environmental Law and Justice
Clinic). The regulators were not settling past violations and requiring a plan for the power plant
to come into compliance, in effect assisting the company‘s plan for future intentional violations.
In a similar fashion, the same air district recently entered into an agreement with another power
plant, forbearing from issuing a notice of violation or filing an enforcement action, even though
the power plant did not have a valid permit to construct or operate its 530-megawatt plant. See
Compliance Agreement between Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt.
Dist. (May 1, 2009) (on file with the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic); Letter from
Deborah Jordan, Director, Air Division, EPA Region IX, to Randy S. Livingston, Vice
President, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Aug. 13, 2009) (on file with the clinic) (accompanying
EPA‘s notice of violation to Pacific Gas & Electric, which alleges that the company did not
have a valid pre-construction permit under the Clean Air Act).
34. Leslie Fulbright, Big Victory for Hunters Point Activists, S.F. CHRON., May 15, 2006,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/05/15/MNGE4IRVT91.
DTL.
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government agencies charged with protecting their health had
allowed future violations of the power plant‘s air permit. They sued
both the air district and the power plant under the Clean Air Act‘s
citizen suit provision,35 and successfully stopped the power plant
from continuing the violation.36
The same local group also successfully filed litigation against the
city‘s transportation agency, which runs the municipal bus system,
when it reneged on its obligation under an ordinance to retire the
oldest and dirtiest diesel buses, which resulted in excess diesel
emissions.37
Clients also commonly ask the clinic to file claims against
pollution sources that cause a nuisance. These suits typically allege
that facilities emit intense and persistent odors or contaminated dust.
Our clinic has received requests to investigate or file lawsuits against
a yeast manufacturing company, a Kraft pulp mill, a steel foundry,
and a large construction project disturbing naturally occurring
asbestos-laden rocks. The clients in these cases describe odors or dust
that interrupt their lives and prevent them from fully enjoying their
homes, schools, and neighborhoods. The odors and dust deter them
from leaving windows open, sitting in their backyards, gardening,
walking, biking, and relaxing after work. Like residents living near
other sources of pollution, residents who live near a nuisance are
burdened with persistent worries about their families‘ and their own
health.38 Unfortunately, nuisances are not well regulated by state or
federal pollution control laws.39
35. The citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006).
36. Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. Mirant Potrero, LLC, No. C-01-2348-PJH
(N.D. Cal.) (consent decree entered Oct. 30, 2001).
37. Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. S.F. Mun. Transp. Agency, No. CPF-07507960 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Dec. 28, 2007); Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v. S.F.
Mun. Transp. Agency, Settlement Agreement and Release (July 15, 2008).
38. See, e.g., Satterfield, supra note 20, at 3–6 (studying the emotional impact of a toxic
dust nuisance).
39. See NOGA MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN
THE COMMON LAW STATE 24–26 (2003).
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D. The Common Thread in EJ Litigation
This informal sampling of EJ litigation shows that litigation
results from the EJ groups‘ decision that the level of pollution in their
neighborhood is ―too much,‖ or that the pollution significantly
interferes with their quality of life.40 EJ lawsuits thus address
governments‘ failures to enforce regulations that would improve the
environment; the siting or expansion of additional pollution sources;
and violations of permit limits by either large sources that dominate
the ―pollution-scape‖ of the neighborhood or by sources that cause a
nuisance.41
EJ clients pursue litigation because it may be the only way to get a
seat at the table with the regulators and sources of pollution.
Litigation is uniquely successful in motivating pollution sources to
40. There are also EJ groups, including Native American tribes, that file litigation for
benefits denied. See, e.g., Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm‘n, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D.
Cal. 2009); Williams, supra note 16. They are an important species of EJ litigation but are
beyond the scope of this Article.
41. The conclusion that that EJ litigation results from neighborhood pollution is
unsurprising because EJ groups typically are formed to address that particular problem. For
example, Bayview Hunters Point Community Advocates was formed ―to ensure environmental
justice, to promote economic alternatives that contribute to the development of environmentally
safe neighborhoods and livelihoods and to secure the political, economic, cultural and social
liberation of this community.‖ See Complaint at 4, Bayview Hunters Point Cmty. Advocates v.
Mirant Potrero, LLC, No. C-01-2348-PJH (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2001). Communities for a Better
Environment states that its mission is ―to achieve environmental health and justice by building
grassroots power in and with communities of color and working-class communities.‖
Communities for a Better Environment Mission, http://www.cbecal.org/about/mission.html
(last visited Dec. 2, 2009). The mission of national environmental groups, on the other hand, is
to improve the environment in general. See, e.g., Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC),
http://www.nrdc.org/about/mission.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2009) (NRDC‘s mission is ―to
safeguard the Earth: its people, its plants and animals and the natural systems on which all life
depends‖). It would also be safe to say that national environmental groups have followed the
public interest litigation model, focusing on ―policy-oriented cases, where a decision will affect
large numbers of people or advance a major law reform objective.‖ GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 5 n.3 (1991) (quoting a
1976 Council for Public Interest Law study). When large environmental groups work on
neighborhood pollution as an issue apart from a campaign that they might have, they appear to
work in collaboration with community groups. For example, NRDC assisted a group in a
community which is 98 percent people of color, sue a foam manufacturer in South Los Angeles,
after regulators failed to enforce longstanding violations of air quality laws. See MICHAEL E.
WALL, MIRIAM ROTKIN-ELLMAN & GINA SOLOMON, NATURAL RES. DEFENSE COUNCIL, AN
UNEVEN SHIELD: THE RECORD OF ENFORCEMENT AND VIOLATIONS UNDER CALIFORNIA‘S
ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND WORKPLACE SAFETY LAWS 24 (2008).
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negotiate with community groups. Lawsuits force corporate decision
makers to consider the merits and practicalities of their position at
every stage of the case—from answering the complaint, to deciding
whether to file motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, and
eventually to devising positions for mandatory settlement
conferences. The same is true when the lawsuit is filed against a
regulator. Lawsuits force regulators to retract decisions that are
without basis. In addition, where judicial decisions are necessary for
statutory or regulatory interpretations, litigation is the only available
recourse.
IV. IS EJ LITIGATION THE BEST STRATEGY FOR SOLVING
NEIGHBORHOOD POLLUTION PROBLEMS?
Before I consider whether litigation is the best strategy for solving
neighborhood pollution problems, I must first emphasize that I do not
question EJ groups‘ place in the court system. EJ advocates
undoubtedly agree that citizens‘ ability to enforce laws is a positive
jurisprudential development, and we passionately decry decisions that
erode our access to the courts. We do so for good reason. Without
private enforcement, federal environmental statutes might merely be
laws on the books rather than effective cleanup or pollution
prevention tools. Without access to courts, our clients‘ communities
undoubtedly would have dirtier air, water, and soil. Without the
ability to go to court, our clinic‘s clients would not have any legal
recourse against polluters who exceed permit limits without
censure—and sometimes with explicit permission—from the very
regulators who are tasked with enforcement. The clients would still
have attempted political and possibly legislative fixes, but one
important tool—judicial enforcement—would be missing from their
arsenal.
It is still useful, however, to examine whether litigation
necessarily is the best strategy for solving neighborhood pollution
problems. I argue that litigation is insufficient to address cumulative
pollution or nuisance sources because, in addition to being resource
intensive and difficult to pursue, it does not have the potential to cure
the root cause of the problem of cumulative pollution. In addition,
while litigation may be successful in addressing particular nuisance
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sources, they tend to cause a nuisance wherever they operate, which
suggests that broader national regulation, rather than individual
litigation, is necessary to address the problems that they create.
A. Problems Inherent in Private Enforcement and EJ Litigation
As Professor Spinak notes in the context of family court, courts
and indigent clients will always have few resources, and courts are
not always the best fora for problem solving. EJ advocates agree.
First, private environmental enforcement presents many
challenges. Judicial fora are not often favorable to our clients because
court cases require extensive investment of both time and money.
Environmental plaintiffs must secure funds to hire experts and be
ready to pay other costs of litigation. Once in court, there are other
obstacles; for example, a union may seek to intervene on behalf of
the defendant that you have sued, or the defendant may claim that it
has a settlement that is imminent with the government.42 Legislation
enacted after a litigation victory may upset the result the plaintiffs
achieve in litigation. And, court cases can take a long time.
Moreover, even when it is possible to prove that a polluter is
violating its permit limits, courts rarely shut down facilities. It is
often incomprehensible to lay clients that a facility whose pollution
control equipment is insufficient to comply with the law nonetheless
will be allowed to operate. One‘s driver‘s license may be revoked for
driving under the influence, but not so with air pollution permits.
Additionally, litigation outcomes are never certain. Cases involving
technical determinations pose different and additional challenges. For
example, few engineers, air quality modelers, and health experts are
available to community groups, and Clean Air Act cases may require
one or more of these experts.43
42. In one case, even though the defendant asked the court on April 11, 2006, to stay
discovery and set a later trial date because it was discussing settlement with the U.S. EPA, the
consent decree between the government and the defendant was not lodged until October 2,
2007. Joint Case Management Statement and Proposed Case Management Order at 10,
Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Evergreen Pulp, Inc., No. CIV 06-00002 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 11, 2006); Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. Evergreen Pulp, Inc., No. CIV 0600002 (N.D. Cal.) (consent decree entered Oct. 2, 2007).
43. For a discussion of the practical limitations of private enforcement, see generally
Eileen Gauna, Federal Enforcement of Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the
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Statutory environmental cases also present narrative challenges—
environmental stories are not easy to tell, and in some instances they
encounter uncomprehending audiences. For example, in a case
involving a permit violation, the statutorily created proof structure
enables enforcers to move for summary judgment on liability by
presenting evidence that the defendant has a permit limit and,
according to the defendant‘s own information, has exceed the permit
limit. That narrative reflects the evidence, and yet it lacks emotional
appeal. This narrative challenge exists not only for environmental
justice advocates, but also for government enforcers and large
environmental groups that act as citizen enforcers.
Sometimes the narrative is more complicated. The Bayview
Hunters Point compliance and mitigation agreement case referred to
earlier illustrates the complex narrative challenges that environmental
justice advocates face. In that case, the two agencies charged with
enforcing the Clean Air Act, the regional air district and the EPA,
documented their decision not to enforce permit violations in a
Compliance and Mitigation Agreement, in which the regulators
explicitly allowed future violations of the power plant‘s permit
limits.44 When government agencies actively condone violations,
either through variance agreements or so-called compliance
agreements, it presents a particularly difficult narrative challenge for
citizen enforcers.45
Likewise, regulators‘ election of remedies can present narrative
challenges. Sometimes, regulators do not push for the remedy that the
community believes is appropriate and just. In one Environmental
Law and Justice Clinic case, for example, the community groups
believed, based on expert reports and the company‘s past compliance
history, that a paper mill should install a specific piece of pollution
control equipment to cure recurring permit violations for particulate
Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1995), and Jim Hecker, The Difficulty of
Citizen Enforcement of the Clean Air Act, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 303 (2004).
44. See Compliance and Mitigation Agreement between Mirant Potrero, LLC and the Bay
Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (Mar. 29, 2001) (on file with the Environmental Law and Justice
Clinic).
45. Unfortunately, such agreements are not uncommon for the air districts in California,
whose hearing boards have authority to grant variances. This authority has a statutory basis. See
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42350–42364 (2006).
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matter. This equipment was more expensive to install and operate
than that which the EPA required. In that case, the EPA was only
willing to push for less expensive retrofits because the agency
expected those changes to resolve the Clean Air Act violations.
While the citizens ultimately were able to obtain the more stringent
pollution controls in settlement, the difference in the positions of the
EPA and the citizens created a challenge in the case.
These challenges exist because, where governments‘ positions are
inconsonant with those of citizens, courts tend to view governments
as the primary enforcers of environmental laws and regulations,
despite the important role that Congress contemplated for citizens.46
Thus, citizens are adversaries not only to polluters, but also to
government. While some courts view citizens in the role in which
Congress envisioned them when it enacted citizens‘ provisions into
our national environmental laws, others view citizens as interfering
with the sovereign‘s prosecutorial or environmental decision making.
In addition to these challenges, many of which are also applicable
to environmental litigation generally (and not just to EJ litigation), EJ
advocates have pointed out that litigation can have the effect of
disempowering communities because lawyers, not community
members themselves, lead the representation.47
B. EJ Litigation’s Potential to Get at the Root Cause of Such
Litigation
Despite the many difficulties inherent in private enforcement by
EJ groups, a substantial number of these groups end up in court to
enforce environmental laws. The existence of this active docket,
however, does not speak to its ability to resolve the underlying
problem of cumulative pollution or nuisance sources. One way to test
the efficacy of EJ litigation is to ask the three questions that activistscholar Luke Cole used in his advocacy, which is rooted in the
community empowerment model: Will the strategy educate people,
including clients, policymakers, decision makers, and the public?
46. See Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean and
Healthy Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013, 11014–17 (2004).
47. See, e.g., RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 433.
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Will the advocacy build a movement? Does the strategy address the
cause rather than the symptoms of a problem?48
1. Will Litigation Educate People about Neighborhood Pollution?
Litigation probably will not educate people about cumulative
pollution. EJ groups who bring the litigation already are acutely
aware of the general problem, whether they articulate it as a problem
of cumulative pollution or, as Lucy Ramos does, as ―enough is
enough.‖49 Indeed, the focus on the need to address cumulative
pollution from the point of view of the receptor, the community that
breathes the pollution and, more broadly, is exposed to the soil and
drinks polluted water or eats contaminated fish, is among the most
important contributions of the environmental justice movement to
environmental regulation.50 That is, ―straw on the camel‘s back‖
litigation comes precisely from what the community already knows
to be multiple assaults on its system from the environment.51 The
public at large probably already has heard groups complain that they
have ―had enough‖ of their share of pollution.
48. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 668 (1992).
49. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
50. To be sure, the Clean Air Act sets caps on cumulative air pollution in the sense that it
requires the EPA Administrator to publish National Ambient Air Quality Standards for each
criteria pollutant. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006). But these caps are specific for each criteria pollutant
and are not set at a neighborhood level. In addition, the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
provisions of the Act require proposed sources in attainment areas to demonstrate the impact of
the emissions on air quality. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470–7492. But again, the relevant geographical
area is the air quality region, which can be quite large—at times the entire state. In addition, the
analysis of impacts is performed one pollutant at a time. Human beings obviously do not
breathe one pollutant at a time. For an excellent analysis of how existing statutory and
regulatory schemes do not address cumulative pollution, see Annise Katherine Maguire, Note,
Permitting under the Clean Air Act: How Current Standards Impose Obstacles to Achieving
Environmental Justice, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 255 (2009). Maguire‘s Note points out that:
[The Toxic Air Contaminants] Summary [in Marathon‘s permit application] identifies
ninety-one different pollutants that will be emitted, including many chemicals known
to have acute, and often carcinogenic and/or chronic effects . . . However, because
Marathon‘s application states that all ninety-one chemicals individually satisfy the
health-based screening levels, Marathon need not undertake any additional analysis.
Id. at 274.
51. See Gauna et al., supra note 31, at 7.
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Policymakers and decision makers are unlikely to be educated by
litigation. When such parties are sued about particular rulemaking—
say under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards that deal with
lead, which I discussed earlier52—the pleadings in the lawsuit are
unlikely to raise cumulative pollution as an issue because they tend to
be narrowly framed around the statutory violation. ―[F]raming issues
in legally sounds ways robs them of ‗political and purposive appeal
. . . ‘ [T]he technical nature of legal arguments can denude issues of
emotional, widespread appeal.‖53 Even if litigation can educate
people about cumulative pollution, it is an oblique way to do so.
As to neighborhood nuisances, litigation certainly will generate
press about the particular source of the nuisance and thus educate
members of the public who otherwise had not known about the
problem, but media attention generally does not focus on the source
for long. In addition, long before there is litigation about a nuisance
source, regulators are likely to know about the source through
community complaints of odor or dust; litigation therefore does not
necessarily add any educational value.54
2. Will Litigation Build a Movement?
In my experience, litigation about a new or expanding source or
an environmental bad actor in the neighborhood rarely builds a
movement. Litigation may result from a movement to clean up the
neighborhood, but not the other way around. The potential for
movement building in a suit against a regulator is even less bright.
Much of the action occurs in the lawyers‘ offices, not in the streets or
52. See supra notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text.
53. ROSENBERG, supra note 41, at 121 (quoting JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978)).
54. Surrounding the period when a Clean Air Act enforcement action was filed against the
nation‘s third largest foundry in Communities for a Better Environment v. Pacific Steel Co.,
community members made 549 odor complaints in a seven month period to the regional air
district. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff CBE‘s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Cmtys. for a Better Env‘t v. Pacific Steel Casting Co., No. C 06 4184
BZ, 2006 WL 2703351 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 16, 2006); see also Website of Councilmember
Linda Maio, City of Berkeley, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/ContentDisplay.aspx?id=37072
(last visited Dec. 2, 2009). The foundry‘s odor problem was well known to the air district,
which had issued an abatement order in 1983. See MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 39, at 159–60.
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community halls.55 ―‗[L]egal tactics not only absorb scarce resources
that could be used for popular mobilization . . . [but also] make it
difficult to develop broadly based, multiissue grassroots associations
of sustained citizen allegiance.‘‖56
3. Will Litigation at Least Address the Cause of the Problem and
Not Just the Symptoms?
Litigation does have the potential to offer case-specific solutions
to additional pollution or wrongheaded regulations that EJ groups are
attempting to fight. This is the primary reason to bring EJ litigation.
However, litigation does not have the potential to address the cause
of cumulative pollution. Elevated background pollution will exist in
EJ communities, even if particular litigation is successful in fighting
off a proposed new or expanded facility.57 The Bayview Hunters
Point community, for example, has successfully fought off a
proposed expansion of the Potrero power plant, but the community
remains concerned about the pollution that already exists.58
Litigation has the potential to address aspects of nuisance
problems. But tort litigation is difficult at best, and, even in
successful cases, abatement of the problem is not a guaranteed
remedy.59 Moreover, litigation under statutory environmental
provisions can only produce relief that incidentally addresses the
nuisance. For example, community members may privately enforce
permit limits on volatile organic compounds and thereby reduce
odors, but the limits may not be set low enough to eliminate the
55. See Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Rousing the Restless Majority: The Need for a BlueGreen-Brown Alliance, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1 (2004) (discussing the challenges of building
a more cohesive and inclusive environmental movement). As Bradley Angel states, ―if not
careful and if not complementing a community organizing strategy, litigation can disempower a
movement.‖ E-mail from Bradley Angel, supra note 7.
56. ROSENBERG, supra note 42, at 12 (quoting MICHAEL MCCANN, TAKING REFORM
SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM (1986)).
57. See Maguire, supra note 50, at 264–67.
58. Conversations with Karen Pierce, President, Bayview Hunters Point Community
Advocates (July 1, 2009).
59. See Melissa Toffolon-Weiss & J. Timmons Roberts, Toxic Torts, Public Interest Law,
and Environmental Justice: Evidence from Louisiana, 26 LAW & POL‘Y 259, 280–84 (2004)
(discussing remedial limitations as one of many challenges in bringing complex environmental
justice cases).
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nuisance.60 In addition, there may be sources of odors other than
volatile organic compounds, and a lawsuit to enforce limits on
specific chemicals will not address those alternative sources.
Professor Morag-Levine has also painstakingly documented that
nuisance-based odor regulations administered by regional air quality
districts rarely work.61 Such regimes rely on detection and
confirmation of the complaints by government inspectors, who often
cannot show up in time to make a confirmation.62
In short, piecemeal litigation directed at a problem source or
regulation fails the test of the community empowerment model.
Looking at the same issue from another vantage point, environmental
problems are systemic problems,63 and such issues can rarely be
addressed solely through litigation.64
60. This situation occurred with Pacific Steel Casting, the third largest foundry in the
nation, which is located in West Berkeley, California. The company‘s installation of a carbon
adsorption system in 2006 reduced the number of odor complaints from the community, but
strong odor is still a problem for residents who live or work nearby. Carbon absorption takes
out a certain percentage of volatile organic compounds, which are responsible for the odor,
before the foundry emissions are released to the outside air. Cmtys. for a Better Env‘t v. Pacific
Steel Casting Co., No. C06-4184-BZ (N.D. Cal Mar. 16, 2007) (consent decree entered).
Professor Morag-Levine describes the residents‘ struggle with the same company in the 1980s
in her book, CHASING THE WIND. See MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 39, at ix–xi, 154–61.
61. MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 39, at 143–78.
62. Professor Morag-Levine describes her personal experience with the complaint
process:
[W]e often were unable to have our complaints confirmed. In the interval between our
phone call and the arrival of the inspector, the odor often disappeared as a result of
shifts in wind direction or in the foundry‘s production processes. The inspector would
arrive and sniff the air but neither she nor I could detect any trace of the smell. . . .
Even our hard-won successes in confirmation did not usually trigger action, because
five separate confirmations during a twenty-four hour period were required before the
Air District would issue a citation to the foundry.
Id. at ix–x.
63. See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 619, 642 (1992) (―Environmental laws
are not designed by or for poor people. The theory and ideology behind environmental laws
ignores the systemic genesis of pollution.‖).
64. Some would say that litigation has failed to produce social reform in ―education,
voting, transportation, accommodations and public places, and housing.‖ ROSENBERG, supra
note 41, at 70–71. Rosenberg concludes that ―a closer examination reveals that before Congress
and the executive branch acted, courts had virtually no direct effect on ending discrimination‖
in those areas. Id. at 70. ―Only when Congress and the executive branch acted in tadem with the
courts did change occur in these fields. In terms of judicial effects, then, Brown [v. Board of
Education] and its progeny stand for the proposition that courts are impotent to produce
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If litigation targeting a specific problem does not achieve reform,
could there be impact litigation directed at neighborhood pollution,
such as cumulative pollution? A plausible cause of action for such
impact litigation would be against government agencies involved in
permitting pollution facilities, but these types of cases have proved to
be very difficult.65 Practically speaking, then, impact litigation to
address neighborhood pollution, even in its limited form—i.e.,
against recipients of government funding—is unlikely to effect
reform.
V. REFORMS TO ADDRESS NEIGHBORHOOD POLLUTION
Government agencies regulating pollution have not implemented
meaningful reforms to address environmental justice. This gap speaks
more to the lack of political will than to the lack of good ideas.
Because EJ groups have unique knowledge of the problem of
neighborhood pollution, recommendations on regulation of
cumulative exposure or risks and nuisance sources already are part of
the recommendations to achieve environmental justice in general.
A. Specific Recommendations to Improve Cumulative Air Pollution in
EJ Communities
In this part, I will discuss some recommendations for achieving
environmental justice at the neighborhood level.66 Although many of
significant social reform.‖ Id at 71.
65. See Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES
AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 35 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999);
Philip Weinberg, Equal Protection, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS, supra, at 12–15. But exceptions are
bound to exist, and Miller v. City of Dallas, No. Civ. A. 3:98-CV-2955 D, 2002 WL 230834
(N.D. Tex. 2002), may be worth studying to determine whether the plaintiffs obtained any citywide injunctive relief. In denying the city‘s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff‘s claim
that Dallas engaged in race-based discrimination in zoning, the Miller court found that the
effect of the city‘s practices along with its ―sordid history of . . . racially-segregated zoning and
related policies . . . offers substantial circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.‖ Miller,
2002 WL 230834, at *7. The case settled after this decision. However, a recent case involving
allegations of racially discriminatory transit funding, Darensburg v. Metropolitan
Transportation Commission, 611 F. Supp. 2d 994 (N.D. Cal. 2009), illustrates that it is still
difficult to prove disparate impact claims.
66. One of the most difficult challenges to achieving environmental justice at the
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these recommendations do not directly address cumulative pollution,
their implementation would at least lessen the existing disparities.
1. Ending the Exemption of Old Facilities from Requirements to
Update Pollution Controls
Citing in part EJ communities‘ concern about the oldest and
dirtiest facilities that typically are present in their communities, a
panel of the National Academy of Public Administration
recommended that Congress end grandfathering of existing facilities
and instead require them to install state-of-the art pollution controls
within ten years, if they had not previously undergone such a
process.67 The panel pointed out that, in enacting the new source
neighborhood level is that equitable solutions necessarily involve land use decisions: site
selection for locally unwanted uses, the process for making that decision, and the ability of
communities to participate in that decision. See Lee, supra note 3, at 67. While it is not my
intent to address land use reforms, thoughtful recommendations worthy of mention include the
following:
a. Incorporate environmental justice concerns as a factor to consider and discuss in
local comprehensive plans. Patricia Salkin, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 32 REAL
EST. L.J. 429, 432–33 (2004).
b. Ensure meaningful public participation of EJ communities in the development of
zoning, rezoning and planning laws and local comprehensive plants. See Salkin, supra,
at 435–37.
c. Survey grandfathered uses that do not conform to local zoning laws to determine
whether those uses pose environmental disparities and target them for closure. Salkin,
supra, at 440 (citing Michael B. Gerrard, Environmental Justice and Local Land Use
Decisionmaking, in TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A TO Z: ADULT USES TO
ZONING 148 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001)). Local amortization laws can facilitate the
closure. Salkin, supra, at 440.
d. Impose restrictions on uses that impact EJ. Salkin, supra, at 429–30.
e. Impose additional requirements on pollution sources in EJ communities. Salkin,
supra, at 443.
f. Provide standards to limit certain nuisance-like activities. Salkin, supra, at 443–44.
g. Establish a buffer between incompatible land usees. Salkin, supra, at 443.
See also RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 360 (discussing
an Alabama law that prohibits more than one commercial hazardous waste treatment facility per
county). These land use reform ideas, however, compete with political forces calling for
economic development. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 399, 401–02. In this regard, Joe Lyou of
California Environmental Rights Alliance has an interesting idea. He believes that a local
ordinance that mimics red-light district ordinances would serve EJ communities well.
67. NAT‘L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., BREATH OF FRESH AIR: REVIVING THE NEW SOURCE
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(―NSR‖) provisions of the Clean Air Act,68 Congress did not envision
that these old facilities would continue operating beyond twenty-five
years, but many old factories are still operating and have not
upgraded their pollution controls.69 This proposal is now more than
six years old, and nothing has been done to advance it. It is one of the
most important proposals for national regulation because it would
have a significant impact on neighborhood pollution.
2. Capping (but Not Trading) Air Pollution
The Bay Area Environmental Health Collaborative (―BAEHC‖),
which was formed to address neighborhood cumulative air pollution,
has developed a detailed air pollution reduction protocol. The
protocol asks the regional air district to ―prohibit new point sources
and air emission increases at existing sources‖ in EJ communities that
are highly impacted by such pollution.70 To implement the
prohibition, the air district would be required to designate highimpact areas based on a calculation of risk-weighted air emissions.71
Existing schemes, such as NSR requirements to offset new
pollution in areas that fail to attain the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards, also offer a potential structure for limiting the total level
of neighborhood air pollution.72 Under what are known as
nonattainment new source review provisions, the Clean Air Act
REVIEW PROGRAM 21–22 (2003). See also Gauna et al., supra note 31, at 6.
68. The Clean Air Act sets ―standards of performance‖ for new sources of pollution. 42
U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
69. NAT‘L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 67, at 14, 23.
70. BAY AREA ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH COLLABORATION, PROPOSED BAY AREA AIR
POLLUTION REDUCTION PROTOCOL 1 (2009), http://baehc.org/downloadables/BAEHC_
PollutionReductionProtocol_March2009.pdf [hereinafter PROTOCOL]. Some also call these
high-impact or EJ communities ―sacrifice zones.‖ See Dayna Nadine Scott, Confronting
Chronic Pollution: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Risk and Precaution, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
293, 318–19 (2008).
71. PROTOCOL, supra note 70, at 1, 3.
72. At the local level, there have been two ordinances that address mitigation or offset of
emissions. Huntington Park, California, has a zoning ordinance that requires mitigation and
reduction of adverse environmental impacts. Chester, Pennsylvania, has adopted an ordinance
that prohibits new facilities from increasing pollution. See RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 26, at 360 (citing NAT‘L ACAD. PUB. ADMIN.,
ADDRESSING COMMUNITY CONCERNS: HOW ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE RELATES TO LAND USE
PLANNING AND ZONING (2003)).
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requires large new or modification of sources, called major sources or
major modifications, to offset certain kinds of new air pollution.73 In
addition to regulating major sources of pollution, regulators can
require new sources—regardless of size—to offset air pollutants that
cause neighborhood impacts, so that there is no net increase in EJ
communities. For capping to work effectively to address cumulative
pollution in the neighborhood, however, offsets must occur for new
pollution at the same facility. Grant programs to small sources could
be established to assist these sources in complying with new
regulations to counter the argument that this type of regulation is too
burdensome.
3. Eliminating the Use of Emission Reduction Credits in EJ
Communities
One of the greatest injustices of air pollution regulation and
enforcement is that sources violating air quality laws rarely are
required to offset the excess emissions that result from their
violations. On the other hand, these sources routinely request
emission reduction credits and bank them for future expansion
projects or use them in lieu of required pollution reduction projects.
This imbalance should be fixed by prohibiting the use of emission
reduction credits in EJ communities. Without these credits, sources
operating old, dirty facilities will be forced to upgrade their pollution
controls.
In addition, when sources in EJ communities violate air quality
laws, enforcers should attempt to require cancellation of emission
reduction credits owned by such sources in an amount equal to or
exceeding the excess emissions resulting from their violations.
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(1)(A) (2006). The new source review provisions govern
criteria air pollutants. See id. §§ 7407(d), 7501(2) (2006); ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 33 (2001).
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4. Building on Measures Already Implemented by Other Air
Quality Regulators
EJ communities are awaiting real changes that address cumulative
pollution and are tired of government regulators paying lip service to
environmental justice while proceeding with business as usual. To
counter this perception, regulators must take specific steps to address
cumulative pollution at the neighborhood level.
Having taken bolder steps than most agencies in setting a
regulatory agenda for environmental justice under the leadership of
its current Governing Board, the South Coast Air Quality
Management District (―SCAQMD‖) established a multi-year plan to
address environmental justice concerns.74 Under this program, the air
district enacted fleet rules, which are both historic and remarkable.
The fleet rules target diesel exhaust from transit buses, trash trucks,
street sweepers, airport taxis, school buses, and other fleets.
SCAQMD adopted the rules after an extensive study, which found
diesel exhaust responsible for approximately 70 percent of the total
cancer risk from air pollution and emissions from mobile sources
responsible for 90 percent of the cancer risk. The study also found
that the highest cancer risk occurs in areas near ports and along major
freeways.75
In the San Francisco Bay Area, as a result of BAEHC‘s advocacy,
the air district has designated six ―priority zones,‖ and has proposed
to limit risks from emissions of toxic air contaminants from new and
modified sources in these zones.76 The district‘s proposal, however,
does not account for risks from existing sources, and thus, while a
step in the right direction, is still an incomplete effort.
Other regulators can follow and build on these approaches. First,
committing to a multi-year plan, as SCAQMD has done, will ensure
that a program enjoys consistency from year to year; it reflects the
commitment of the governing board; and it is not simply an
afterthought. Second, other regulators can move relatively quickly to
74. See SCAQMD, History of Environmental Justice, http://www.aqmd.gov/ej/history.
htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
75. See AQMD Launches Major Study of Toxic Air Pollution in Southland, Feb. 5, 2004,
http://www.aqmd.gov/news1/2004/matesiiipr.html.
76. KLOC, supra note 10, at 4.
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implement specific regulatory programs, such as enacting similar
fleet rules and establishing priority zones, to instill confidence in the
government‘s resolve to address components of cumulative pollution.
5. Starting with the Definitional Challenge: Lack of Data Is an
Opportunity for Collaboration with Community Groups
Despite EJ groups‘ ability to define and identify an EJ
community, regulators struggle to define EJ communities.
Collaborative work with community groups would help regulators to
identify the areas where cumulative pollution is a problem and focus
their attention accordingly.
B. Limitations of the Recommendations to Address Cumulative
Pollution and Suggestion for Government Commitment and Citizen
Involvement
One of the limitations to both the elimination of grandfathering
and the requirement for capping pollution in EJ communities is that
not all air pollutants can be effectively eliminated with technology,
and not all air pollutants are regulated. Moreover, EJ communities
would have to monitor new sources going in to ensure that no net
pollution increases are occurring. EJ groups currently do not have the
resources to routinely monitor new source permitting, and many
major new sources and modifications evade community review.
Thus, it is difficult to see how EJ groups could effectively monitor
the caps without significant funding from the government or
foundations.
Aside from the capacity issue, the biggest stumbling block to
capping proposals is that regulators lack the political will to
implement caps. Caps necessarily mean that new sources may not be
built if offsetting new pollution is infeasible, and regulators have
shown very little willingness to deny permits. As an advocate once
said, it is not unusual for regulators to think of pollution sources as
their clients77 and accordingly believe that they do not have authority
77. Thomas Alan Linzey, Executive Dir., Cmty. Envtl. Legal Def. Fund, Lecture at the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Sins of the Fathers: How Corporations Use the
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to deny a permit, despite the existence of scholarly works and an
EPA memorandum stating otherwise.78 BAAQMD in particular has
stated that caps involve land use decisions, which the agency does not
believe it has the authority to make.79 Indeed, because of this lack of
will, no permit has been denied on cumulative impacts grounds, in
spite of overwhelming evidence that EJ communities suffer from
cumulative pollution.80
Unquestionably, what is delaying reform is not a lack of good
ideas—there are plenty of those. What we need is for our
representatives to summon the courage and political will to do the
right thing and protect vulnerable Americans, not just the ones who
give the most money to political campaigns.81 Given that the lack of
will is a political reality, it is incumbent on communities to mobilize
in favor of protective state, regional, and local environmental and
land use laws and regulations.
Environmental leaders such as Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and Green
Party advocate Thomas Alan Linzey assert that we need a movement
Constitution and Environmental Law to Plunder Communities and Nature (Mar. 4, 2004).
78. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus & Stephanie Tai, Integrating Environmental Justice into
EPA Permitting Authority, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 617 (1999); Memorandum from Gary Guzy, Gen.
Counsel, to certain EPA Assistant Adm‘rs, EPA Statutory and Regulatory Authorities Under
Which Environmental Justice Issues May Be Addressed in Permitting (Dec. 1, 2000) (available
at http://www.epa.gov/R5water/uic/uic_ej.htm). Perhaps the Attorney General‘s offices at the
federal and state level should confirm the authority these regulators already possess to take
cumulative impacts account in permitting.
79. Conversations with Amy Cohen, Program Director, BAEHC (May 20, 2009).
80. In the nine years that I have been with the Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, I
know of no permits that the regional air district has denied. Although permit denials are rare,
they do occur. In 2007, EPA denied Romic Environmental Technologies Corporation a permit
required under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act for hazardous waste facilities,
following a resolution passed by the landowner, Gila River Indian Community Council, not to
sign Romic‘s permit application. Because the landowner‘s signature and certification were
missing from the permit application, the EPA denied the permit. See William H. Carlie, EPA
Denies Hazardous Waste Permit, Orders Firm to Investigate TCE Releases, 39 BNA ENV‘T
REP. 79 (2008). In 2008, Roderick L. Bremby, Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health
and Environment, became the first air quality regulator to deny a permit to a coal-fired power
plant solely because of health risks associated with carbon dioxide emissions. In response to
this denial, the power plant sued the regulator. State politicians then got involved to allow the
power plant to build. See Tim Carpenter, Sunflower Condemns Lawsuit Attempts to Halt Coal
Expansion, TOPEKA CAP. J. Aug. 4, 2009, available at http://cjonline.com/news/state_
government/2009-08-03/sunflower_condemns_lawsuit.
81. Rechtschaffen, Strategies, supra note 12, at 321.
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to reclaim America from corporate power.82 BAEHC‘s work on
cumulative pollution indeed has required a movement on a regional
level. First, activists frustrated with the lack of regulation and
enforcement decided that they needed to work on the regional air
district; second, they created a broad new coalition of several existing
coalitions and grassroots groups; and third, they met with each other
and with the regional air district to make demands. They made public
statements of their purpose, and they earned respect by demonstrating
their persistence, expertise, and commitment.83 Importantly, in order
to be successful in its efforts, the group secured sufficient startup
funding, which was first provided by the San Francisco Foundation.
As a result of the persistent work of BAEHC, the Bay Area Air
Quality Management District is beginning to take notice of the group
and is laying the groundwork to tackle the serious challenge of
cumulative risk.
C. Specific Recommendations to Nuisance Pollution in EJ
Communities
Traditional common law means of addressing nuisances like odor
and dust are insufficient for EJ clients like ours. Our clinic‘s clients
are generally uninterested in the traditional tort remedy of monetary
compensation; rather, the clients want nuisances to be abated. But
abatement is extremely difficult to obtain under common law. It is
thus important to consider strategies for preventing the odor nuisance
in the first place, rather than addressing the nuisance after the fact.84
In considering approaches to preventing emissions of odorous
substances from industries, regulators should seriously consider
federal regulation as a strategy. The substances that are responsible
for odor often result from emissions of hazardous air pollutants as
Professor Morag-Levine has described.85 The Clean Air Act already
82. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE (2004); Linzey, supra note 77.
83. Late sociology professor Charles Tilly characterized social movements in exactly this
way. See CHARLES TILLY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 1768–2004 (2004).
84. MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 39, at 128–42.
85. The South Coast Air Quality Management District, in announcing its effort to
improve odor identification, stated that:
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has a mechanism for regulating hazardous air pollutants, and their
emissions can be reduced through application of control technology
and practices.
The first step of identifying nuisance sources should not be
difficult since most nuisance sources are readily known to regulators,
as SCAQMD‘s experience demonstrates.86 Nuisance sources are
generally known to be steel foundries; waste transfer and recycling
stations; wastewater treatment plants; landfills; composting
operations; petroleum operations; food and byproduct processes, such
as rendering facilities and yeast manufacturing facilities; and
agricultural activities, such as livestock operations.87
Federal regulations should be considered seriously also because
they can be enforced by citizens through the citizen suit provision,
unlike local or state laws, which may not provide citizens with a right
of private enforcement.
While some existing regulations take odor into account in setting
compliance standards,88 more can be done. The EPA, for example,
can identify nuisance sources, begin a process to understand the air

The [district] receives thousands of complaints about odor from the public each year.
Odors are the single largest source of complaints reported by residents of the South
Coast Air Basin and comprise almost half of the total air quality complaints received
annually. Of these, the vast majority (approximately 85%) are linked to an identifiable
source.
South Coast Air Quality Management District, AQMD Staff to Enhance Odor Identification,
May 1, 2009, http://www.aqmd.gov/news1/2009/odoridentification.html.
86. See, e.g., South Coast Air Quality Management District, supra note 85.
87. Morag-Levine, supra note 39, at 128–42.
88. See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources: Kraft Pulp Mills, 43 Fed.
Reg. 7568, 7569 (Feb. 23, 1978); see also Approval and Promulgation of State Plans for
Designated Facilities and Pollutants; Oklahoma; Plan for Controlling Total Reduced Sulfur
from Existing Kraft Pulp Mills, 54 Fed. Reg. 24,903, 24,904 (June 12, 1989) (approving
Oklahoma‘s plan for controlling TRS emissions from a kraft pulp mill under the New Source
Performance Standards provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11–1 and explaining that
―TRS emission have a distinctly unpleasant odor which may adversely affect property values
and economic development in the vicinity of kraft pulp mills‖). The EPA later characterized its
1978 regulation as a ―welfare related‖ control, rather than a health-based control. 54 Fed. Reg.
at 24,904. The EPA, however, makes a distinction between regulation of odor under the New
Source Performance Standards and the State Implementation Plan. See Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania; Approval of Revision to the Pennsylvania State Implementation Plan, 51 Fed.
Reg. 18,438 (May 20, 1986) (withdrawing former approval of a state and local odor control
regulation, which had been part of a State Implementation Plan, because it bore ―no significant
relation to attainment and maintenance of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards‖).
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pollution components of the nuisance problem, and fund research to
address it. The process could even follow the recommendation of the
National Environmental Justice Advisory Council that the EPA
―convene, support, and promote a series of workshops, focus groups,
stakeholder meetings, scientific symposia, conferences, and other
dialogue to promote greater understanding and consensus around‖ the
problem.89
In addition to regulations that limit hazardous air pollutants, State
Implementation Plan (―SIP‖) rules can be considered for addressing
odor because volatile organic compounds, which are ozone
precursors and therefore regulated through the SIP,90 are also
responsible for odors. Nationwide regulation, rather than the SIP
mechanism, however, is superior because the EPA can coordinate the
effort.
Interestingly, even though it is easy to identify categories of
odorous facilities, and it is well known that stench from such
facilities severely interferes with quality of life, regulators appear
unwilling to set technology standards to abate the nuisance without
first documenting that there is a certain level of community
complaints. As Professor Morag-Levine has argued, this wait-and-see
approach to addressing odor is steeped in the common law regime
and is inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the Clean Air Act.91
Even the most forward-looking air district, SCAQMD, is at most
willing to refine the methods to detect odor so that prosecution can be
improved, which may eventually result in an abatement order. All of
these steps take time. It would be far better for communities living
near nuisance facilities if the air district skipped the community odor
detection stage and set the technology standards first. As anyone who
89. NAT‘L ENVTL. JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, ENSURING RISK REDUCTION IN
COMMUNITIES WITH MULTIPLE STRESSORS: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND CUMULATIVE
RISKS/IMPACTS, at vii (2004).
90. Emissions of volatile organic compounds (―VOCs‖) are regulated under the Clean Air
Act because VOCs (found in chemicals, such as solvents, gasoline, and other petroleum
products) react in the presence of sunlight with NOx to form ground-level ozone, and ozone is a
criteria pollutant. 69 Fed. Reg. 23858, at 23859 (Apr. 30, 2004) ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 73, at 33.
91. MORAG-LEVINE, supra note 39, at xi.
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has lived near such a facility knows, these facilities emit odor even if
the inspectors cannot be around to detect the stench.92
Despite the limited and perhaps backward nature of SCAQMD‘s
effort to deal with environmental nuisances, it is still noteworthy as
the first step that any air district has taken in considering the
environmental justice aspect of the nuisance problem. SCAQMD
recently announced a pilot program that could improve prosecution
efforts under the agency‘s existing nuisance regulation.93 The agency
is recognizing that its current nuisance regulation insufficiently
addresses the impacts on communities from odorous sources.94 The
chair of the air district‘s governing board recognizes, for example,
that ―[f]oul odors can severely impact a person‘s quality of life or
even their health.‖95 According to the district, an odor science expert
who has developed an odor identification device will ―review the
agency‘s complaint database, which includes the number and type of
complaints reported, the types of facilities suspected or confirmed as
sources of the odor and other relevant information.‖ 96 The expert will
then recommend steps for enhancing odor detection for the purpose
of issuing notices of violation to facilities.
In short, although SCAQMD‘s approach is not ideal, it is a step in
the right direction. A better approach would be a national effort at
identifying nuisance sources and beginning the lengthy process of
regulating them.
CONCLUSION
The pursuit of environmental justice has not moved much beyond
the rhetorical sphere, although the consistent efforts of communities
92. For an account of the difficulties in making formal complaints and having them
accurately recorded, see Janice Schroeder, Comments at a Community Meeting Organized by
the West Berkeley Alliance for Clean Air and Safe Jobs (Feb. 7, 2007) (statement on file with
author).
93. South Coast Air Quality Management District, supra note 85.
94. The text of the agency‘s nuisance rule, which was adopted in 1976, is available on its
website, South Coast Air Quality Management District, Rule 402, http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/
reg/reg04/r402.pdf
95. South Coast Air Quality Management District, supra note 85 (quoting William A.
Burke).
96. Id.
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have resulted in some hopeful signs from government leadership. The
fact remains, however, that thirty years after environmental justice
became a rallying cry, we still cannot point to a single regulation that
takes into account cumulative air pollution at a neighborhood level.
To take cumulative risk seriously, governments at all levels must
commit to addressing the problem with actual regulation. As a
society, we must ask ourselves how we can live in a world where
poor and historically oppressed people bear the brunt of our luxuries.
It is incumbent on us as citizens to build an effective movement that
encourages our government to better protect its people.

